Abstract.Digital signature, a cryptographic algorithm, provides integrity, authentication and non repudiation messages.In the literature, several certificateless signature schemes have been designed. However, most of them are vulnerable to the ephemeral secret leakage (ESL) attack.We propose a new secure certificateless signature scheme which can resist ESL attacks.Moreover, we prove the security of two types of adversaries in certificateless signature schemes.The proposed scheme provides unforgeability based on the hardness assumption of CDH problem.
Introduction
In 1984,Shamir first introduced the identity-based public key cryptography [1] . This algorithm uses a string generated by the user's identity information to represent his public key. Thus it can simplify the management of certificates.However, all of the user's private key are generated by the key generation center PKG, which leads to the problem of key escrow. In 2003, the certificateless public key cryptography proposed by Al-Riyami and Paterson solved this problem [2] . In this system, the user's private key is composed of two parts:a partial private key generated by KGC and the secret value selected by user.
Several certificateless signature schemes(CLS) [3] [4] [5] have been proposed,since the certificateless public key cryptography appeared. However, most of the schemes are insecure and can be attack by a public key replacement. Later, some more secure certificateless signature scheme have been proposed, which can resist the public key replacement attack to some extent [6] [7] [8] [9] . These schemes need to generate a ephemeral secret to generate signatures. Ephemeral secrets (i.e. random values) are chosen to generate signatures, called probabilistic signatures in the sense that a signer can issue distinct signatures for the same message [11] . Note that the ephemeral secret keys x or y are not the only session-specific secret information used by the parties-they also use secret random coins in the signature generation. We observe that if the adversary reveals these random coins, it can break the security of the protocol. [15] 。 If the ephemeral secret keys are compromised, an adversary can reveal the private key of the signer from the corresponding signature, termed ephemeral secret leakage (ESL) attacks [11] .This attack is possible and widely studied recently in [11] [12] [13] [14] . Since the sender must rely on internal/external source of random number generator that may be controlled by anadversary [12] .Note that,the schemes above are vulnerable to the ESL attack.Note that,if the attack gets the ephemeral secret,he can compute the user's secret key and forgery use it. Therefore, the scheme above can not resist the ESL attack.In this paper we propose a new certificateless signature scheme which is able to resist ESL attack.
Preliminaries
Bilinear Maps. Let G 1 be an additive group with prime order q ,P is the generator of G 1 . Let G 2 be a multiplicative group with the same order.An admissible map e :G 1 ×G 1 →G 2 is called a bilinear map if it satisfies the following properties [16] :
(1)Bilinearity: For any P,Q,RG ∈ 1 , we have e(P+Q,R)=e(P,R)e(Q,R) and e(P,Q+R)= e(P,Q)e(P,R). In particular, for any a,b Z ∈ q * , e(aP,bP)=e(P,P) ab = e(P,abP)=e(abP,P) [9] .
(2)Non-degeneracy: There exists P,QG ∈ 1 , such that e(P,Q)= 1. (3)Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P,Q) for all P,QG ∈ 1 . Security Assumption.Discrete Logarithm (DL) Problem: Given a generator P of a cyclic group G with order q, and MG to find an integer aZ ∈∈ q * ,such that M=aP. Computational Diffie-Hellman(CDH) Problem: Given a generator P of a cyclic group G with order q, and given aP,bP for unknown a,bZ ∈ q ⊥ and to output true if the signature is valid, or . Security Model for Leakage-Free Certificateless Signature Schemes.There are two types of adversaries which named Type I adversary and Type II adversary in CL-PKC.
A type I adversary A I does not have access to the master-key, but he has the ability to replace the public key of any entity with a value of his choice.
A type II adversary A II has access to the master-key but cannot perform the public key replacement [16] .
The security of a CLS scheme is modeled via the following two games between a challenger C and an adversary A I or A II .
Leakage-Free CLS Schemes
Our leakage-free CLS scheme consists of seven algorithms which are described as follows.
Setup: This algorithm generates the params and the master key of the system.
(1)Given a security parameter k, the KGC chooses a cyclic additive group G 1 with prime order q.P is the generator of G 1 .KGC chooses a cyclic multiplicative group G 2 with the same order. and a bilinear map e : G 1 ×G 1 →G 2 .
(2)The KGC also chooses a random sZ ∈ q * as the master-key and sets P pub = sP. Sign: To sign a message M using the partial private key D ID and the secret value x, the signer, whose identity is ID i and the corresponding public key is PK ID , performs the following steps.
(1)Choose a random r ∈ Z q * , compute U = rP. 
Security Proof
Theorem 1. In the random oracle model,the proposed CLS scheme is existential unforgeable against the A I adversary assuming the CDH problem is intractable. Proof. Let C be a CDH attacker who receives a random instance (P,aP,bP) of the CDH problem in G 1 .Let A I be a super type I adversary that breaks the proposed signature. We show how C can use A I to solve the CDH problem, that is to compute abP.
First C sets P pub =aP,where P pub is the public key of the KGC.Then C selects params={G 1 ,G 2 ,e,q,P,P pub ,H 1 Sign Queries: Note that at any time during the simulation, equipped with those partial private keys for any ID i ≠ID j , A I is able to generate signatures on any message. If ID i =ID j ,A I issues a query (mi,PK IDi ) where m i means a message and PK IDi means a current public key chosen by A I to the signature whose private key is associated with ID j . On receiving this, C creates a signature as follows:
(1)Select k,u,v Z ∈ q * in random.Set U i =P-kP and R i =kP. )).So C can successfully obtain the solution of the CDH problem.
Theorem 2. In the random oracle model,the proposed CLS scheme is existential unforgeable against the A II adversary assuming the CDH problem is intractable.
Proof. Let C be a CDH attacker who receives a random instance (P,aP,bP) of the CDH problem in G 1 .Let A II be a super type II adversary that breaks the proposed signature. We show how C can use A II to solve the CDH problem, that is to compute abP.
First C selects a random s Z ∈ q * as the master-key and sets P pub =sP,where Ppub is the public key of the KGC.Then C selects params={G 1 ,G 2 ,e,q,P,P Sign Queries: Note that at any time during the simulation, equipped with those partial private keys for any ID i ≠ID j , A II is able to generate signatures on any message. If ID i =ID j ,A II issues a query (m i ,PK IDi ) where mi means a message and PK IDi means a current public key chosen by A II to the signature whose private key is associated with ID j . When C receives this, C creates a signature as follows:
(1)Select k,u,v Z ∈ q * in random.Set Ui=P-kP and Ri=kP. )).So C can successfully obtain the solution of the CDH problem.
Comparative Analysis
In this section, we have calculated and analyzed the security performance and efficiency of the proposed scheme. First, the proposed scheme can resist ESL attacks, however, the scheme [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] can not.Now, we describe the vulnerability of [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] for ESL attacks. Then,we compare the efficiency of the proposed scheme with the schemes [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] .For the performance comparison with respect to calculation cost,we considered the following notations.The performance comparison are showed in Table 1 . [6] 2*T s +T h +T mul T e +2*T mul +2*T i +T s +T h Yes G+2*Z Scheme in [7] T s +T h +2*T mul 2*T e +T mul +T i +T h Yes 2*G Scheme in [8] 2*T h +2*T mul 2*T e +T mul +2*T h Yes 2*G Scheme in [9] 2*T h +3*T mul 4*T e +3*T h Yes 2*G Scheme in [10] 3*T mul 2*T e +2*T mul +T h Yes 3*G The proposed scheme 4*T h +5*T mul 3*T e +2*T mul +4*T h No 2*G The table shows that the bilinear operation of scheme [6] is the least, but the computational complexity is very high.Signature length and security performance which schemes [7] [8] [9] produces are similar. The scheme [10] makes small computational cost, but the signature length is long.Although our scheme produces some computational cost,however, it can resist ESL attacks and provable security in the random oracle model.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new secure certificateless signature scheme. This new scheme can resist ESL attacks.Moreover, we prove the security of two types of adversaries in certificateless signature scheme.The proposed scheme provides unforgeability based on the hardness assumption of CDH problem.Therefore, this scheme can be used in many security applications.
